COP30: A Summary for Risk Professionals

Context and Expectations

There was little cause for optimism heading into the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), hosted in Belém, Brazil.

Tom Strachan

COP30 marked the 10th  anniversary of the Paris Agreement, an ambitious pledge made at COP21 to both limit global warming to “well below” 2.0°C and to “pursue efforts” to further limit warming to 1.5°C. Its signatories are periodically required to release incremental emissions reduction plans, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which can be used to estimate global progress on climate change. The latest round of NDCs project between 2.3 and 2.5°C of warming by the end of the century — well beyond both limits mentioned in the Paris Agreement.

The United States, the world’s largest economy and second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, did not participate for the first time since the COPs began in 1995. The nation had withdrawn once again from the Paris Agreement, exacerbating the leadership vacuum in global climate diplomacy and destabilizing consensus, and leaving other powers — notably the E.U. and China — to take on a more central role.

However, even these nations appear more cautious in their latest net zero roadmaps. Just three days into COP30, the E.U. adopted a controversial new policy allowing nations to purchase problematic foreign carbon credits to reach a portion of their 2040 mitigation goals. Similarly, China, despite being the world’s largest emitter, set an emissions’ reduction goal of only 7-10% by 2035.

Meanwhile, private interests have also retreated from climate commitments. The UN-backed Net Zero Banking Alliance (NZBA) — established at COP26 in 2021 to help align banks’ lending with net-zero emissions by 2050 — collapsed just weeks before COP30 following a mass exodus of major U.S., Canadian, European, Australian, and Japanese banks.

Ryan Littlefield

Additionally, COP30 delegates would have to reckon with the outcome of COP29, which produced a relatively unambitious “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) of USD 300 billion in annual climate finance by 2035 — far short of the estimated USD 1.3 trillion required — all but guaranteeing further negotiation and debate.

Undeterred, nearly 60,000 envoys from nations around the world traveled to Belém to participate in COP30, and, after more than two weeks of negotiations, a deal was passed. A deal in and of itself may be regarded as a success, given the increasingly divergent climate agendas of attending nations –— ultimately, however, precious little progress was made towards securing a future well below 2.0°C of warming.

Key Successes

• A deal passed, despite little progress: The COP30 “global mutirão” agreement was significantly diluted from what was originally proposed, as various coalitions of nations were unable to find common ground on key issues, including finance and emission reductions. Ultimately, several targets from previous COPs were reaffirmed or slightly altered, but little progress was made toward securing the commitments to achieve them. However, there were minor victories on several specific policy fronts.
• An agreement to develop a formal mechanism to support countries in enacting a “just transition”: A “just transition” is one that prioritizes climate efforts that benefit disenfranchised groups, workers, and affected communities, as well as combat inequality. Including a mechanism in the agreement, rather than an action plan, ensures developing countries will have active support for their "just transition" plans.
• Brazil's launch of a fund to prevent deforestation in the tropics: The Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) is a blended finance fund that raised USD 6.6 billion during COP30 and has a goal of mobilizing USD 125 billion to compensate countries with tropical forests for preserving them against deforestation. This was a key priority highlighted by President Lula de Silva.

Key Failures

• No mention of fossil fuels in final text: COP30’s flagship “global mutirão” decision contains no explicit reference to fossil fuels or a negotiated roadmap to transition away from them, despite fossil fuels being the largest source of emissions. Instead, the presidency proposed developing a fossil-fuel roadmap outside the formal UNFCCC process, to be presented at COP31.
• 1.5°C warming limit reaffirmed, but no pathway set: The final text reaffirms a commitment to keeping 1.5°C “within reach” and notes the remaining carbon budget is small and rapidly shrinking. However, it does not set a binding pathway or other process to ratchet ambition; instead, it calls for greater voluntary emissions cuts this decade.
• Adaptation finance target delayed, and baseline year removed: The final text restated a COP26 target of tripling adaptation finance, but pushed the deadline back to 2035 from 2030, and removed any reference to a baseline year (originally 2021).
• No endorsement for latest climate science: The final text pertaining to “research and systematic observation” failed to endorse the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as a provider of the best available science, and omitted the latest scientific evidence provided by the IPCC and others. Language about countering climate misinformation was also dropped, prompting criticism publicly from multiple countries. The IPCC was, however, endorsed in the “global mutirão” text.
  
  

Implications for Risk Professionals

For risk professionals, these outcomes underscore the growing disconnect between climate ambition and climate action, reinforcing climate change and the net-zero transition as sources of persistent and evolving financial risk.

The reaffirmation of the 1.5°C goal in the absence of explicit commitments on fossil fuels, coupled with the the dilution or delay of climate finance and adaptation targets, increases the probability of disorderly transitions, sudden policy realignments, and growing physical risk over time. Furthermore, initiatives such as the Tropical Forest Forever Facility and the proposed just transition mechanism point to a continued reliance on markets, blended finance, and private capital to fill gaps left by insufficient public action.

Overall, COP30 has further highlighted the need for risk frameworks that account for prolonged policy uncertainty, fragmentation in global climate governance, and the compounding effects of delayed action across credit, market, and strategic risk horizons.

Parting Thoughts and Outlook for COP31

COP30 has kept the UN process alive, but it has also exposed the weaknesses inherent to the COP process. The final package reaffirmed the 1.5°C limit, while avoiding hard choices: fossil fuels were not explicitly addressed, adaptation finance commitments were diluted, and the text did not endorse the latest climate science.

However, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago vowed that, although they were excluded from the “global mutirão”, roadmaps on the transition away from fossil fuels and on deforestation would be developed and presented at COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye (November 2026).

For many, COP31 will serve as a test of whether the current model of climate diplomacy can move from declarations to delivery. Ultimately, progress will depend on whether governments, institutions, and markets can translate partial consensus into action.

For a detailed breakdown of the outcomes from COP30, see this report by CarbonBrief.