Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) and Collateral Management in the light of Basel III, Basel III.5 and EMIR

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“All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.”

Grafik: PWC
Context

New Regulatory Framework

- **Markets**: MIFID II, MIFIR, EMIR
- **Banks**: Basel II.5, III, III.5, SSM, SRM, etc.
- **Funds**: AIMFD, AIMFR, UCITS
- **Insurance Companies**: Solvency II
- **IFRS**: 9-13, Good Will, Leasing
- **EU-Supervisory Framework**: EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, ESRB
- **USA**: Dodd-Frank Act, Volcker Rule
- **Central Clearing**: USA, EU, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia & Canada, Singapore, etc.

CCPs, OTFs, Trade Repositories

- **Mandatory clearing**: apply to
  - Trades between financial institutions,
  - Corporate groups which exceed usage thresholds
- **Key factors in an instrument being capable of being cleared**:
  - Standardisation [product, legal, process]
  - Liquidity
  - Risk management/modelling
- **Capital costs of bilateral trades drives down volumes for non-cleared trades**
- **Significant change in the business model and organisation structure for Dealers**
- **Clearing will absorb significant high grade collateral**

Default Risk and Migration Risk

- **CCP versus OTC**
- **Default Risk**: Basel II Framework enhanced by correlation multiplier and stressed EEPE
- **Migration Risk**: Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA)
- **Funding Cost Modelling**: DVA, FVA
- **Collateral**: Higher collateral requirements on non-cleared trades, initial margin requirements
- **Pre & post trade transparency**
- **New capital charges**: reduce bank capacity and widen spreads

**ISDA**

- **Credit Events**: Bankruptcy, Failure to pay, Restructuring, Repudiation/ Moratorium, Obligation and Acceleration Default, Government Bail in
- **Big Bang and Small Bang Protocols**
- **ISDA 2003 versus ISDA 2014**
- **ISDA Master Agreement and Schedule**: Single Agreement Philosophy
- **Credit Support Annex (CSA)**
- **Valuation**: Move from LIBOR Discounting to OIS Curves
- **2012 ISDA Margin Survey**: 71% of OTC derivatives trades were subject to collateral agreements, 83% of these required collateral to be posted in both directions
Counterparty Credit Risk:
CVA\ Downgrade losses substantially exceeded default losses.

Defaultable Derivatives:

Deutsche Bank
Bank A enters into Payerswap with DB:
Notional: 100m€,
Maturity: 5Y
CDS-spread CP: 100 bp

Total capital charge “Counterparty Credit Risk” (CCR)

1. Counterparty default risk + 2. Counterparty migration risk

Mark-to-market losses due to credit valuation adjustments (CVA) were not directly capitalised. Roughly two-thirds of CCR losses were due to CVA losses and only one-third were due to actual defaults. (BCBS, 2009)

Reforms:
(i) Mandatory central clearing of standardised OTC derivatives
(ii) Mandatory margining (IM₀ and VM₀) for OTC-derivatives if the 2 contract partners are banks and/or systematically relevant Non-financials. IM₀ is a major challenge as new, gross and restricted re-use. Sophisticated internal margin models or (very) conservative regulatory margins
(iii) Bank capital requirements for derivatives-related exposures
Counterparty Credit Risk:
CVA\ Motivation

- A derivative contract can have a positive or a negative market value
- Derivatives with a positive value constitute a claim to the counterparty
- If the counterparty defaulted, the loss would be the replacement cost of the contract (i.e. the current market value)
- A derivative contract with a defaultable counterparty is less worthy than a contract with a risk-free counterparty
- The lower the creditworthiness of the counterparty, the lower the market value of the contract.
- The value of derivative contracts decrease, if the counterparty becomes riskier (e.g. an obvious indicator is a downgraded). Note: the value decreases even if all market parameters have not changed!
- Massive (unexpected) downgrades of counterparties (like the large investment banks in 2007/09) generate large migration losses in derivative trading books.
- These losses have not been backed with capital under Basel II, but have to be backed with capital under Basel III.
- The default risk of these contracts has been covered under Basel II.
Counterparty Credit Risk:
Motivation of Basel III - amendments

**Aim...**

More adequate capitalisation of credit counterparty risks as under Basel III

Provide Incentives to move from OTC transactions to central counterparties (CCPs)

Account for systemic risk, interconnectedness and procyclicality

Reduce Operational risks

**... by implementing...**

... a better understanding of wrong-way risks (stressed exposures) ... introducing CVA-risk charge

... low risk weights for CCP-derivatives: Default risk: 2%, Migration risk: 0%

... asset value correlation multiplier

... new qualitative requirements for back and stress testing
Counterparty Credit Risk:
All Basel III-amendments regarding counterparty credit risk.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current treatment is insufficient w.r.t.:</th>
<th>Proposed remedies to better account for counterparty credit risk (CCR)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MtM-downgrade risk</td>
<td>(i) Regulatory capital calculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unexpected) Default risk (accounted for currently by Basel II)</td>
<td>(A) CPPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model validation</td>
<td>(B) OTC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micro level</th>
<th>Macro level</th>
<th>(ii) CCR management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Qualitative</td>
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<td>monitoring general</td>
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<td>wrong-way risk</td>
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<td>Improve op. perf.</td>
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<td>of collateral dept.</td>
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<td>Reduce reliance on</td>
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<td>For both, IM and SM</td>
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<td>Only for IM</td>
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</table>

Incentives to move from OTC to CCP transactions

For both, IM and SM

Only for IM
Increased electronification of certain product markets continue, catalyzed by regulatory demands (e.g. IR Swaps, CDS)

Due to illiquidity in certain asset markets, investment banks still feature as broker-dealers in market making role as an important price generation entity

Source: Oliver Wyman
Institutions in the network of OTC derivatives exposures (BIS 2013)
Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G-16 dealers</th>
<th>Other dealers/banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank of America Merrill Lynch</td>
<td>ANZ Banking Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barclays</td>
<td>Banca IMI SpA</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNP Paribas</td>
<td>Banco Santander</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citigroup</td>
<td>Bank of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crédit Agricole</td>
<td>Bank of New York Mellon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Suisse</td>
<td>BBVA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deutsche Bank</td>
<td>Commerzbank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goldman Sachs</td>
<td>Commonwealth Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSBC</td>
<td>Danske Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP Morgan Chase</td>
<td>Dexia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan Stanley</td>
<td>DZ Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nomura Group</td>
<td>Group BPC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Bank of Scotland</td>
<td>Intesa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Société Générale</td>
<td>LBBW</td>
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<tr>
<td>UBS</td>
<td>Lloyds Banking Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wells Fargo</td>
<td>Mitsubishi UFJ</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mizuho</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National Australia Bank</td>
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<td>Nordea Bank</td>
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<td>Rabobank</td>
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<td>Standard Chartered</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State Street</td>
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<td>Unicredit Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Connectivity” assumptions:

- The G-16 dealers have exposures to one another with probability 100%.
- The G-16 dealers have exposures to other dealers with probability 50%, and vice versa.
- Other dealers have exposures to one another with probability 25%.
The network perspective

- **Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms (BIS, August 2013):** network study featuring 41 banks, including the 16 largest derivatives dealers (G-16 dealer) to mimic the structure of the OTC derivatives market: **highly interconnected “core” /less interconnected “periphery”**.

- **Assumptions:** G-16 dealers are exposed to one another with 100% probability, G-16 dealers are exposed to other banks with 50% probability, other banks are exposed to one another with 25% probability.

- **Changes in the creditworthiness of the dealers:** Default probability of directly affected dealers rises, their counterparties will incur mark-to-market losses in the form of an increase to the credit valuation adjustments (CVAs) applied to derivatives exposures. The losses then reverberate through the network of OTC derivatives exposures as follows: rising default probabilities lead to mark-to-market-losses which drive up leverage, thereby further increasing default probabilities.

- The likelihood of an event that drives up default probabilities in the first place is inferred from **CDS premia**.

1. construct a network of OTC derivatives exposures;
2. quantify a relationship between counterparty credit risk, mark-to-market losses and leverage ratios;
3. model the impact of changes in leverage ratios on default risk;
4. calibrate the likelihood of the shock that brings the system to its “tipping point”.

Credit Counterparty Risk
Key variables used in analysing the benefits of reforms (BIS 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leverage ratio</td>
<td>Leverage is calculated as Tier 1 Capital / Total Assets. Total Assets includes derivatives exposures. For firms reporting on a US GAAP basis, these have been adjusted to include derivative asset and netting. Risk-weighted assets are not used due to difficulties encountered in compiling a comparable database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of default</td>
<td>Probability of default is inferred from CDS prices. CDS premia are a function of both probability of default and loss given default (LGD). Standard assumptions apply with LGD = 60%. But prices are also adjusted to take into account country-specific factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derivatives exposures</td>
<td>Derivatives exposures are reported as mark-to-market values (assets and liabilities and notional amounts) only, broken down into the following product types: interest rate, credit, equity, commodity, currency and other.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in the creditworthiness of the dealers:

- Apply Shock to default probabilities of major OTC derivatives dealers
- Default probability of directly affected dealers rises
- Their counterparties will incur mark-to-market losses in the form of an increase to the credit valuation adjustments (CVAs) applied to derivatives exposures.
- The losses then reverberate through the network of OTC derivatives exposures
- Rising default probabilities lead to mark-to-market losses which drive up leverage, thereby further increasing default probabilities
Credit Default Swaps

Quelle: - Bloomberg
iTraxx® Europe
### REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE MARKETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EMIR</strong></th>
<th><strong>MIFIR</strong></th>
<th><strong>MIFID II</strong></th>
<th><strong>Basel 2.5/3/3.5</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Clearing obligation for some classes of OTC derivatives/ Exemption: intragroup transactions (insofar as they do not increase systemic risk)</td>
<td>• Shifting derivatives trading to organized markets (Organized Trading Facilities/OTFs)</td>
<td>• Increasing the competitive position of European Financial Markets/Competition among financial services providers</td>
<td>• Basel 2.5: Increase of Capital Requirements Trading Books: Incremental Risk Charge, Comprehensive Risk Charge, Stressed-VaR, Treatment of Securitized Products in the Trading Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clearing Obligation for Financial Counterparties/ Non-Financial Counterparties, insofar as the clearing threshold is exceeded (whereby hedging does not count into the clearing threshold)</td>
<td>• Transparency of trade and reporting requirements</td>
<td>• Strengthening Investor Protection and Confidence of Market Participants</td>
<td>• Basel III: Abolishment of Tier 3 Instruments (Short Term Subordinated Bonds) as capital to cover risk in the Trading Book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Derivative contracts are to be reported to a transaction register (“Trade Repository”)</td>
<td>• Specific monitoring in relation to financial instruments and derivatives positions</td>
<td>• Organizational requirements and rules on the conduct of business of investment firms respectively trading venues</td>
<td>• Basel III: Introduction of CVA-Risk-Charge - Requirement to cover price volatility from Counterparty Risk with Risk Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supervisory by/ Reporting Obligations to ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase of Transparency by Disclosure of Risk Positions</td>
<td>• Basel 3.5 (Fundamental Review of the Trading Book): Substitution of Value at Risk by Expected Shortfall to cover Extremal Risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Credit Risk Reduction</td>
<td>• Credit Risk Reduction</td>
<td>• Credit Risk Reduction</td>
<td>• Classification of Trading Book Positions by different Liquidity Horizons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New Transparency of the Derivative Markets: Central Clearing Counterparties, Organized Trading Facilities and Transaktion Repositories**

**Investor protection and confidence of market participants, Competition among financial services providers, Organizational requirements and rules on the conduct of business of investment firms respectively trading venues**

**Trading Books: Higher Requirements for Risk Capital, Specific Focus on Price Volatilities of Derivative Positions driven by Counterparty Risk, Specific Focus on Stress Scenarios and Extremal Events**
Central Clearing Counterparties

- A CCP imposes itself as the legal counterparty to every trade.
- This substitution of the counterparties by the CCP typically occurs through a process known as novation, which discharges the contracts between the original trading entities and creates two new, legally binding contracts – one between each of the original trading parties and the CCP.
Better collateralisation of OTC derivatives exposures

either through central clearing or through bilateral credit support agreements. “Collateral is the new capital”
(Capital replaced by collateral)

**Process:** Enhance collateral management

**Models:** Develop internal margin model

Integrating liquidity-into collateral management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collateral mechanics: regulated vs OTC markets</th>
<th>Regulated markets</th>
<th>Over the counter markets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collateralisation</strong></td>
<td>All trades are collateralised</td>
<td>Not all trades are collateralised, it depends on the agreements between the counterparties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial instruments</strong></td>
<td>highly standardised</td>
<td>highly customised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clearing House</strong></td>
<td>There is a Clearing House that acts as counterparty for any trade and establish settlement and margining rules</td>
<td>There is no Clearing House, direct interaction between the counterparties, ad hoc contracts are used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Settlement and margination execution</strong></td>
<td>Daily settlement and margination, collateral in cash of main currencies or highly rated bonds (govies)</td>
<td>Most used contracts are: ✓ ISDA Master Agreement ✓ Credit Support Annex (CSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collateral interest</strong></td>
<td>Overnight rate</td>
<td>Depend on the agreements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: M. Bianchetti – “Bootstrapping The Illiquidity” – Qfin Colloquia, 22 November 2012
ISDA – Document Structure

Definitions (Examples)
- 2006 Definitions
- 1992 US Municipal Counterparty Definitions
- 2005 Commodity Definitions
- 2011 Equity Derivatives Definitions
- 1997 Government Bond Option Definitions
- 2003/2014 Credit Derivatives Definitions
- 1998 FX and Currency Option Definitions
- 1998 Euro Definitions

Protocols (Examples)
- EMU Protocol
- 2001 Credit Support Protocol
- 2002 Master Agreement Protocol
- 2006 Novation Protocol
- CDS Protocols
- Big Bang Protocol
- Small Bang Protocol
- Close-Out Amount Protocol

Legend:
- part of standardized contract
- stand-alone document
- to be signed separately

Source: Prof. Dr. Günter Reiner, ISDA Master Agreement Kommentar, 2013 C.H.Beck
Counterparty Credit Risk:
Basel II vs. Basel III

**Counterparty credit risk (CCR):**
Risk that a counterparty to a transaction defaults or is downgraded before the final settlement of the transaction’s cash flows.

**Basel II: Credit risk for OTC-derivatives**

\[
RWA_{CCR}^{BaselII} = 12.5 \times K \times EaD = 12.5 \times K \times \alpha \times EEPE
\]

\[
K = LGD^* \left( \Theta^{-1}(PD) + \sqrt{R \times \Theta^{-1}(0.999)} \right) - PD \times \frac{1 + (M - 2.5)b}{1 - 1.5b}
\]

\[
R = 0.12 \times \frac{1 - e^{-50PD}}{1 - e^{-50}} + 0.24 \times \left( 1 - \frac{1 - e^{-50PD}}{1 - e^{-50}} \right)
\]

EEPE: effective expected positive exposure, \( b \): maturity adjustment,
\( R \): asset value correlation (AVC)

**Main changes in Basel III to RWA calculation**

1. Add downgrade risk surcharge to account for credit valuation adjustment (CVA)
2.1 Stress EEPE
2.2 Account for higher correlation by adjusting \( R \) with multiplicative factor
Counterparty Credit Risk: Basel II vs. Basel III

\[ RWA^{CCR_{\text{BaselII}}} = 12.5 \cdot K \cdot EaD = 12.5 \cdot K \cdot \alpha \cdot EEPE \]

\[ K = LGD \cdot \left[ \left( \Theta^{-1}(PD) + \frac{R \cdot \Theta^{-1}(0.999)}{\sqrt{1-R}} \right) - PD \right] \cdot \frac{1 + (M - 2.5)b}{1 - 1.5b} \]

\[ R = 0.12 \cdot \frac{1 - e^{-50PD}}{1 - e^{-50}} + 0.24 \left( 1 - \frac{1 - e^{-50PD}}{1 - e^{-50}} \right) \]

Basel II

Basel III

\[ RWA^{CCR_{\text{BaselIII}}} = RWA^{CCR_{\text{BaselII}}} + 12.5 \cdot cc(CVA) \]

\[ = 12.5 \cdot K^{stressed} \cdot (R^{1.25_{\text{banks}}} \cdot \alpha \cdot EEPE^{stressed}) + 12.5 \cdot cc(CVA) \]

2.2 Use a multiplicative factor for R in calculation of K

2.1 Stress EEPE for general wrong way risk

1 Add a charge for CVA-risk as an unexpected loss component
Counterparty Credit Risk
CVA\CCR-capital charge covers default and migration.

Defaultable Derivatives:

Deutsche Bank

Bank A enters into Payerswap with DB:
Notional: 100m€,
Maturity: 5Y
CDS-spread CP: 100 bp

Basel III: Total capital charge “Counterparty Credit Risk” (CCR)

1. Counterparty default risk (already in Basel II)\(^2\) + 2. Counterparty migration risk

Unexpected loss per 1€ exposure x Exposure [in €]

OTC
SA
IMM
CCP

RW\(\text{Rating}^{\text{External}}\)\(^1\) x 8% x

K\(\text{PD}^{\text{Internal}}, R(PD)^2\) x LGD x

CVA losses

Basel III: Total capital charge “Counterparty Credit Risk” (CCR)

\(\Delta\) Credit Value Adjustment

2.1
2.2

2.1 Always
2.2 Only if approved VaR\(_{\text{Specific}}\)

1) Derivatives are usually contracted with counterparties of the regulatory segment “Corporates, Banks, Government”,
2) \(\text{EEPE}_{\text{Basel3}}\): \(\max(\text{EEPE}_{\text{Basel2}}, \text{EEPE}_{\text{stressed}})\); For large banks and all unregulated financial firms: \(R_{\text{Basel3}} = 1.25\times R_{\text{Basel2}}\).
Defaultable Derivatives:

Deutsche Bank, Rating: A+

Notional: 100m€, MtM: 5, Maturity: 5Y

Loans

Interest rate swap 1

Interest rate swap 2

Deposits

Capital

Total capital charge “Counterparty Credit Risk” (CCR)

1. Counterparty default risk

RW(Rating\text{External}) \times 8\% \times CEM

OTC

SA

50\% \times 8\% \times 5 + 100 \times 0.5\%

2. Counterparty migration risk

2.33 \cdot \sqrt{\left(\frac{\text{RW}}{\text{Rating}}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{\text{CEM}}{\text{External}}\right)^2}

Banks, risk-weight (rating):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit assessment of Banks</th>
<th>AAA to AA-</th>
<th>A+ to A-</th>
<th>BBB+ to BBB-</th>
<th>BB+ to B-</th>
<th>Below B-</th>
<th>Unrated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk weight under Option 2</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>150%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add-on

Interest Rates

- Over one year to five years: 0.5\%
- Over five years: 1.5\%

\footnote{1) Derivatives are usually contracted with counterparties of the regulatory segment “Corporates, Banks”}
Counterparty Credit Risk: CVA\CCR_{Basel^{3}} - Example using Standardised Approach

**Defaultable Derivatives:**
- **Deutsche Bank**, Rating: A+
  - Notional: 100m€, MtM: 5, Maturity: 5Y

**Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR):**

1. Counterparty default risk
2. Counterparty migration risk

**OTC SA**
- 0.22 m€

**Total capital charge “Counterparty Credit Risk” (CCR):**

- 2.1
- 2.33 \cdot \sqrt{(0.5 \cdot 0.8 \cdot 2.5 \cdot 5.5)^2 + 0.75 \cdot 0.8 \cdot 2.5 \cdot 5.5)^2}

- 0.26 m€

**Rating w_l**

- \ldots  \ldots
- A 0.8%
- \ldots  \ldots

\( K = 2.33 \cdot \sqrt{\left( \sum w_i \left( M_i \cdot EAD_i^{total} - M_i^{hedge} \cdot B_i \right) - \sum w_i \cdot M_i^{ind} \cdot B_i^{ind} \right)^2 + \sum w_i \cdot M_i^{ind} \cdot B_i^{ind}} \)

\( w_i \) (external Rating), M: effective maturity, Bi: notional, hedge: individual hedge, ind: index hedge
Defaultable Derivatives:

2. Counterparty migration risk

2.1

\[
2.33 \cdot \sqrt{(0.5 \cdot 0.8\% \cdot 2.5 \cdot 5.5)^2} + 0.75 \cdot (0.8\% \cdot 2.5 \cdot 5.5)^2
\]

![Proportion of Swap backed by capital chart](chart.png)
Counterparty Credit Risk:
CVA\ Standardized Approach\ Details

\[ \Delta \text{value} \sim N(0) \]
\[ \Rightarrow \]
\[ \Delta \text{CVA} \sim N(0, \sqrt{\text{CVA-changes}}) \]

### 2. Counterparty migration risk

2.1

\[ 2.33 \cdot \sqrt{(0.5 \cdot 0.8\% \cdot 2.5 \cdot 5.5)^2 + 0.75 \cdot (0.8\% \cdot 2.5 \cdot 5.5)^2} \]

\[ K = 2.33 \cdot \sqrt{\text{h} \cdot \left( \sum_i 0.5 \cdot w_i \cdot (M_i \cdot EAD_i^{\text{total}} - M_i^{\text{hedge}} B_i) \right) - \sum_{\text{ind}} w_{\text{ind}} \cdot M_{\text{ind}} \cdot B_{\text{ind}}} + \sum_i 0.75 \cdot w_i^2 \cdot (M_i \cdot EAD_i^{\text{total}} - M_i^{\text{hedge}} B_i)^2 \]

1\(\sigma\) (CVA-changes, 84%-quantile)

2.33\(\sigma\) (99%-quantile)
Counterparty Credit Risk: CVA\ Internal model\ Details

2. Counterparty migration risk

2.2 $cc^{\text{Market Risk-IRM}}(\Delta \text{CVA}(\Delta s))$

$CVA_{\text{econ}} = (1 - R) \sum_k e(t) \cdot [PD(t_k) - PD(t_{k-1})]$  

$CVA_{\text{reg}} = (LGD_{\text{market}}) \sum_{i=1}^{T} \max\{0; \exp\left(-\frac{\text{spread}_{i-1} \cdot t_{i-1}}{LGD_{\text{market}}} \right) - \exp\left(-\frac{\text{spread}_i \cdot t_i}{LGD_{\text{market}}} \right)\} \cdot \frac{EE_{i-1} \cdot D_{i-1} + EE_i \cdot D_i}{2}$

$t_{\text{T}}$: longest maturity in the portfolio, $t_{\text{i}}$: $i$th revaluation bucket, spread$_{\text{i}}$: counterparty's credit spread at tenor $t_{\text{i}}$, LGD$_{\text{market}}$: market implied Loss Given Default, $D_{\text{i}}$: default risk free discount factor at time $t_{\text{i}}$

- VaR for zerobond with Notional = EaD, Issuer = counterparty, Maturity taken from longest unhedged derivative
- Only risk factor: spread evolution (must be taken from VaR-model)
- CVA-cc = $cc(\text{VaR}^{\text{normal,general}} + \text{VaR}^{\text{normal,specific}} + \text{VaR}^{\text{stressed,general}} + \text{VaR}^{\text{stressed,specific}} + 0*\text{IRM})$

Extremely high burdens for advanced CVA formula “Bundesverband Deutscher Banken” estimates that at most two banks in Germany will apply the CVA advanced formula
Counterparty Credit Risk:
CVA\ Summary: Credit AND market risk in a trading book.

Defaultable Derivatives:
Deutsche Bank
Bank A enters into Payerswap with DB:
Notional: 100m€, MTM: 5y, Maturity: 5Y
CDS-spread CP: 100 bp

1. Market risk
(instrument pricing with risk-free counterparty/ no credit spread of counterparty !!)

2.2 CVA-risk
(no credit spread of counterparty !!, CVA-VaR:
stand.&stress VaR_{gen&spec, 0^{IRM}})

2.1 Counterparty default risk

K = N(0,PD_{CP}) *LGD *α*EEPE

3. Pillar1 - Capital Ratio

Capital_{T1+T2} = 12.5*(VaR_{CVA} + K + VaR_{MR} + VaR_{OpR})
Counterparty Credit Risk: Wrong-way risk (PD(EaD))

Wrong-way risk

Positive correlation between EaD and PD to a given counterparty.
- **specific**: Typically arises from poorly constructed transactions. E.g.: bank holds long a put option on shares of a counterparty that provides own shares as collateral.
- **general**: PD of counterparty is positively correlated with market risk factors.

Current Basel II approach to wrong-way risk

\[ CCR_{\text{Basel II}} = K \times EaD = K \times \alpha \times EEPE \]

\( \alpha \)-factor to account for wrong-way risk
Counterparty Credit Risk: Stressed correlation (R) multiplier for critical counterparties.

**Basel II correlation calculation:**

\[
R = 0.12 \frac{1 - e^{-50PD}}{1 - e^{-50}} + 0.24 \left( 1 - \frac{1 - e^{-50PD}}{1 - e^{-50}} \right)
\]

Correlation (R) ranges from 12% to 24%

**Observation:**

\[
R(\text{financial firms}) = 1.25 \times R
\]

**Proposed changes**

- Multiplicative factor of 1.25 to R for exposures to financial intermediaries that are
  - regulated banks, brokers/dealers, insurance companies with assets of at least USD25 billion
  - unregulated generating majority of revenues from financial activities
    (e.g. hedge funds)

**Comment**

- If a counterparty has low PD and, hence, high R, capital requirements can increases by about 35%
- Interbank lending becomes quite expensive, punishing „good“ intermediaries
Counterparty Credit Risk: Example: Stressed correlation (R) for critical counterparties.

\[ RWA_{\text{CCR}}^{\text{Stressed}} = 12.5 \times \text{LGD} \times \left[ \Theta(R(PD)) - PD \right] \times \frac{1 + (M - 2.5)b}{1 - 1.5b} \times \alpha \times EEPE \]

\[ RWA_{\text{CCR}}^{\text{new}} = 12.5 \times \text{LGD} \times \left[ \Theta(1.25 \times R(PD)) - PD \right] \times \frac{1 + (M - 2.5)b}{1 - 1.5b} \times \alpha \times EEPE_{\text{stressed}} \]
Counterparty Credit Risk: What exactly is EEPE?

**Exposure Methods**...

*EE*: Expected E.

*EPE*: Exp. Positive E.

*EEE*: Effective Exp. E.

*EEPE*: Effective Exp. Positive E.

Revalue the instrument under each scenario

Average for each time point

Quantile for each time point

Effective EPE(t)
Counterparty Credit Risk: Stressed effective expected positive exposure (EEPE)

**Shortcomings of EEPE**
- Does not account for wrong-way risk
- Is not appropriately estimated in periods of stress

**Stressed EEPE (EEPE\textsubscript{stressed})**

**Effective expected positive exposure (EEPE):**

$$EEPE := \sum_{t_k \leq 1yr} \Delta_{t_k} EEE_{t_k}$$

where effective expected exposure (EEE):

$$EEE_{t_k} := \text{MAX}_{t \leq t_k} (EE_t)$$

where EE denotes the expected exposure.

**Stressed EEPE:**

- Define 3yr period including 1yr stress period used for stressed VaR (Market Risk Revisions)
- Calibrate EEPE parameters to this period

**Revised EaD calculation:**

$$EaD = \alpha \times \text{MAX}(\text{EEPE}_{\text{stressed}}; \text{EEPE}_{\text{current data}})$$
Counterparty Credit Risk: Wrong-way risk (PD(EaD))

Basel III approach to wrong-way risk

**general wrong-way risk:** NO EXPLICIT CAPITAL CHARGE but

- **Micro level**
  - **Stressed**
    - effective expected positive exposure
    - $EEPE \rightarrow EEPE_{stressed}$

- **Macro level**
  - Asset value correlation multiplier
    - $R \in [0.12;0.24]$  
    - $\times 1.25$  
    - $R \in [0.15;0.30]$  

- **CCR management / Op risk**
  - tackle shortcomings in $\alpha$-factor estimation

**specific wrong-way risk:**

- Implement **methodology** to identify specific wrong-way risks
- **Identify**
  - specific wrong-way risk for a transaction
  - $EaD = \alpha \times EEPE$
    - no spec. wrong-way risk
    - $EaD = \begin{cases} 
    \text{Notional} & \text{if CDS} \\
    \text{MtM}_{\text{default}} & \text{if EQ-deriv.} 
    \end{cases}$
Counterparty Credit Risk:
Collateralized CPs – fundamentals of margin period of risk.

**Basic definitions**

- **Margin agreement**: Contractual agreement that a counterparty posts collateral when its exposure exceeds a specified level.

- **Margin threshold**: Largest amount of exposure that remains outstanding until one party has the right to call for collateral.

- **Margin period of risk**: Delay between a margin call that a counterparty does not respond to and the start of closing out that counterparty (default procedures).

**Observations**

- **Margin agreements reduce CCR** but pose significant challenges to modelers as future collateral amounts and margin calls ought to be modeled.

- Low margin periods of risk according to Basel II caused **precipitated defaults** and EaD might be underestimated.
Counterparty Credit Risk: Collateralized CPs – fundamentals of margin period of risk.

Proposed floors for margin period of risk (MPR)

- 5 days
- 10 days
- 20 days
- 2*floor

If more than 2 margin call disputes in that netting set in last quarter

How does MPR enter the capital calculation?

\[
RWA_{\text{CCR}}^{\text{Basel III}} = 12.5 \cdot K_{\text{stressed}}(R \cdot 1.25_{\text{banks}}) \cdot \alpha \cdot EEPE_{\text{stressed}} + 12.5 \cdot cc(CVA)
\]

Banks that can calculate EEPE without margining, but not with margining, need to proxy EEPE with margining:

\[
EEPE_{\text{with margining}}^{\text{stressed}} = \max(Margin\text{threshold} + \Delta PE(0, MPR); EEPE_{\text{without margining}}^{\text{stressed}})
\]

Notes:
1) Large netting sets \( \geq 5,000 \) trades at any point during a quarter
2) Illiquid positions \( \leftrightarrow \) one or more trades with either (i) illiquid collateral or (ii) illiquid OTC-derivate (that cannot be easily replaced)
3) \( \Delta PE \): expected increase in the netting set’s exposure beginning from current exposure of zero over the margin period of risk.
Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms (BIS, August 2013)

Requirements and Consequences

- **standardised OTC derivatives**: to be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs),
- **Collateral and Capital**: requirements for collateral to be posted against both current and potential future counterparty exposures, whether centrally cleared or non-centrally cleared, and requirements that banks hold additional capital against their uncollateralised derivative exposures

Increase in the price of risk transfer

- **Collateral**: Requiring OTC derivatives users to hold more high-quality, low-yielding assets as collateral lowers their income.
- **Capital**: Holding more capital means switching from lower-cost debt to higher-cost equity financing.
- **Balance sheet changes**: reduce risk to debt and equity investors but risk-adjusted returns may still fall.
- **Institutions may pass on higher costs to the broader economy in the form of increased prices.**
- **Reduction in economic activity** resulting from higher prices of risk transfer and other financial services.
- **Base Case Estimation**: \(-0.04\%\) of GDP

Lower frequency of financial crises

- **Reduction in forgone output** resulting from a lower frequency of financial crises propagated by OTC derivatives exposures
- **Reduction of counterparty exposures**
- **Estimation**: In the central scenario lowering of the annual probability of a financial crisis propagated by OTC derivatives by **0.26 percentage points**.
- **Present value of a typical crisis estimated to cost 60\% of one year’s GDP**
- **Reforms help avoid losses equal to \((0.26 \times 60\%) = 0.16\%\) of GDP per year**

Network Modeling as described on p. 3

- For each network link: **bilateral exposure** are spread proportionally across linked counterparties such that the total OTC derivatives exposures of each institution are as reported in their financial accounts or regulatory filings.
- The larger the initial change in G-16 dealer default probability, the more financial institutions end up with **leverage ratios above 40**.
- When a sufficient proportion of institutions in the network have leverage ratios at or above this level, the financial system is assumed to tip into crisis.
Further potential impacts

**Multilateral netting of exposures**
- Multilateral netting is maximised when entire portfolios are cleared in a **single location**
- **Portfolio fragmentation**: splitting portfolios between centrally cleared and non-centrally cleared transactions or between multiple CCPs, will reduce netting and increase collateral costs.
- Links or **interoperability** between CCPs could increase the scope for multilateral netting,
- Introduction of **interconnection risks** transmits a participant’s failure across CCPs

**Cost of indirect clearing**
- Indirect clearing can allow access to CCPs for **smaller market participants** who are unable to meet CCP direct membership criteria
- Although clients could avoid the **large fixed costs** involved in direct clearing, they may face higher margin requirements and clearing fees imposed by the direct clearing member compared to those imposed by the CCP on the direct clearers themselves

**Shortages of collateral**
- As the OTC derivatives market reforms are gradually being implemented globally, the imposition of central clearing requirements for standardised OTC derivatives and margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives is expected to increase the demand for high-quality collateral for margining purposes.
- Any shortages of collateral during times of stress may put pressure on the pricing of high-quality assets and increase the costs of engaging in these transactions

**Fragmentation of exposures**
- **Different regulatory requirements** in different jurisdictions may lead to structural changes in the OTC derivatives activities of dealers, particularly in less liquid markets.
- Given the high concentration of the market, any changes in market-making practices precipitated by the requirements could have a significant impact on the pricing and liquidity of OTC derivatives markets.
- This could have particularly important effects in regional or local markets where fewer liquidity providers are present.
Further potential impacts

**Price volatility and margining**

- More comprehensive posting of collateral will strengthen the link between *market price volatility and margining requirements*.
- When market volatility is low, margin requirements will also be low, making it less costly to take risk using derivatives.
- As volatility rises (or is expected to rise) collateral requirements will increase. This may reduce the ability of some market participants to trade or maintain existing positions.
- This may further increase market volatility.

**Business models**

- These include the ability of dealer banks to *alter their business models* and practices in response to the new regulatory environment by

  - reducing involvement in OTC derivatives market-making,
  - lowering their use of OTC derivatives for hedging,
  - choosing alternative hedging instruments (such as exchange-traded derivatives)
  - changing their asset-liability composition, or increasing their reliance on other fee-based income.

**Regulatory arbitrage**

- There is a risk that overlaps, gaps or conflicts in the frameworks, if not properly addressed, could create the potential for regulatory arbitrage:
  - migration of trading to certain jurisdictions,
  - increase systemic risk
  - and also lead to market fragmentation.
  - Among the cross-border issues in this category is the regulatory treatment of CCPs.

**Third-country CCPs**

- The potential *non-recognition* of third-country CCPs could negatively affect Asian OTC derivatives markets: *market liquidity, restrict participation, undermine price discovery*.
  - Non-recognition could imply that some CCPs would be treated as *non-qualifying*, thereby attracting a much higher regulatory capital requirement for trade exposures and default fund contributions.
  - The resulting impact on the price discovery process could also influence hedging decisions, which would adversely affect banks and corporates’ ability to manage interest rate and other risks, thereby potentially *increasing systemic risk*.
Thanks a lot for your time and attention!